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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND TO REFORM
The purpose of this paper is to examine the official and
popular reactions in Czechoslovakia to the Soviet policies of
perestroika and glasnost from Gorbachev's attaining the
post of General Secretary in March of 1985 to the Czech and
Slovak elections in June of 1990. The central argument of
this thesis is that Mikhail Gorbachev, while attempting to
restructure his system, orchestrated the transformation of
Czechoslovakia as well as the other countries of East-Central
Europe. While the paper provides background to the general
socio-political situation in Czechoslovakia before
Gorbachev's "new thinking," emphasis is placed on social,
economic, and political changes that have developed in
Czechoslovakia over a period of five years. The period for
this thesis begins with Gorbachev's attaining power in March
1985 and ends with the June 1990 elections.
Attention is also focused upon the "Velvet Revolution"
in November and December of 1989, and what its impact means
for the future of Czechoslovakia and the country's
relationship with the rest of Europe. This thesis is not
merely a history of events, but rather a history of one man's
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manyimpact on Czechoslovakia. This thesis examines the
factors involved not only with the "Velvet Revolution" and
with the shaping of Czechoslovakia's "new course." Mikhail
Sergeyevich Gorbachev set these in motion.
In March 1985, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev succeeded
Constantin Chernenko as the General Secretary of the Soviet
Union. Since then, the remarkable social, political, and
economic changes occurring within Soviet borders has had a
dramatic impact upon the rest of the globe. The relationship
between the Soviet Union and the United States has improved
substantially, and the degree of cooperation between the two
superpowers has never been greater in the postwar period.
There have been momentous events of lasting historic
significance between the United States and the Soviet Union,
such as the ratifying of the INF Treaty (1987) . Indeed, East-
West relations have entered a new phase of development, the
future of which, will depend in large part on the volatile
political environment in the Soviet Union. At least for now,
some longstanding problems such as arms control and human
rights are being addressed, but nowhere in the world has the
change in Soviet leadership had a greater impact than in
East-Central Europe.
The leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev has certainly paved
the way for sweeping change in East-Central Europe but it has
also caused the revival of some traditional ethnic conflicts
that had been suppressed for forty years due to Soviet
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domination" of the area. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks are
again protesting discrimination from the Czech majority.
Ethnic tension in varying degrees is manifesting itself in
each East-Central European country and is probably most acute
in the Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev's policies have
created the opportunity for reform, they are also responsible
for the surfacing of these ethnic tensions [to come to the
surface.] Outside of dismantling the "nomenklatura" system,
the ethnic/nationalism problems are probably the most serious
obstacles to successful reform in East-Central Europe. If
the new post-communist governments can successfully deal with
the ethnic problems, then the probability of systemic reform
will increase dramatically.
The dual policies of perestroika (restructuring)
,
and
glasnost (openness)
,
initiated by Gorbachev with the goal of
revitalizing the Soviet economic sector have overlapped and
directly influenced the political landscape in East-Central
Europe . Without Gorbachev, or someone very
similar in political outlook, the political changes in East-
Central Europe would not have taken place as rapidly as they
did.
William H. Luers, a former ambassador to Czechoslovakia
wrote that
:
"Gorbachev's revolution is clearly the starting point.
Without the Soviet leader's "new thinking," perestroika
and glasnost, the fundaments of Soviet relations with
Eastern Europe could not have changed so rapidly. It was
Gorbachev '
s
3
changing vision of Soviet national security and nationalinterests that created the conditions for the revolutions
of Eastern Europe." 1
It is quite clear, however, that the Soviet reforms were
viewed with skepticism and ambivalence from most of the
communist leadership in "bloc" countries. In Romania,
Nicolae Ceaucescu flatly denied that any such reforms would
ever take place, while in East Germany, Erich Honecker said
that such reforms were not needed in his country. Gustav
Husak lauded Gorbachev's proposals publicly but was unwilling
to follow the Soviet move toward economic decentralization
and criticism of past "mistakes" made by communist forebears.
This is because Czechoslovakia continued to feel the impact
of the "normalization policies" carried out after the "Prague
Spring" in 1968. Husak adopted a Fabian, or delaying policy
toward the implementation of plans similar to those of the
new Soviet leader. The conservative faction in the
Czechoslovak leadership initially thought that Gorbachev
would lose power in the Soviet Union. In this instance the
Czechoslovak government would be free to continue with the
policy of normalization indefinitely. Gorbachev posed a
dilemma for the Czech leadership because he reversed the
Soviet political and ideological outlook. Where Brezhnevism
had been characterized by conservativeness and later
immobilism, Gorbachev advocated radical, dynamic solutions to
the problems plaguing the Soviet system. As partial
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justification for his policies, Gorbachev criticized
"mistakes" that had occurred under former Soviet leaders.
Increasingly, both Stalin and Brezhnev became subjects of
criticism in the Soviet press and in Gorbachev's speeches.
Since the Czechoslovak leadership owed their positions to
Brezhnev, Gorbachev's criticism became an embarrassment to
them. The justification of Czechoslovak normalization was
jeopardized by Gorbachev's radical departure from Soviet
foreign policy norms. Whether he knew it or not, he
destabilized the Czechoslovak government, and was ultimately
responsible for its eventual downfall in 1989. He made it
impossible for the communist government installed after the
Prague Spring to react and adapt to changes inside the Soviet
Union. Karen Dawisha states that during Gorbachev's first
two years in power the official Czechoslovak reaction was
more openly hostile than expressed elsewhere.
"The same stilted phrases were used to heap empty praise
on the Soviets, and the same ritualistic formulae filled
the columns of the Czechoslovak Party newspaper, Rude '
Pravo, allowing the concealment of the substance of
reforms being introduced in Moscow . . .the leading
figures in Prague openly expressed their concern about
the impact of Soviet reformism on Czechoslovakia . "2
A key point to remember when considering the failure of
communism in Czechoslovakia is that even into the late
1980s, the leadership continued to follow the political and
economic policy of "normalization" that began after the
Prague Spring to eliminate the reformist elements in society.
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The spectre of 1968 lingered in the minds of the
Czechoslovak leadership until eventually it overcame them.
Vasil Bilak, the former Secretary of the Czech Central
Committee
,
published an article in the Soviet Party journal,
Kommunist, attacking efforts to introduce market mechanisms
into socialist economics as
:
. .a stick of dynamite set under the foundations of the
system of political power of the working people
. . .the
correct way lies in precisely the opposite direction:
Making better use of the advantages offered by a
socialist economy
. . .improving planned development
. . .strict and comprehensively substantiated criteria
for each enterprise . "3
Bilak openly praised Soviet intervention in 1968. He
typified the reaction of the Czechoslovak hard liners who
viewed Gorbachev's proposed reforms as both economically
destabilizing, and politically risky. He warned of
".
. .those that wish to misuse against socialism the
general sympathy with which the social changes in the
USSR are regarded . . .he cautioned people to reject
unambiguously any and all parallels, programs, and those
measures which had been designed to dismantle socialism
in 1968. "4
By advocating reform Gorbachev placed the Czechoslovak
policy of "normalization" in an extremely precarious position
concerning the legitimacy of the regime. Judy Batt addressed
this problem of legitimacy, writing that:
"The ideological problem posed by economic reform for
communist one-party states is not that it makes the
Party's position untenable, but that by opening up the
prospect of democracy as an option, it undermines the
logical basis for the Party's absolute claim to the
6
necessity of its "leading role" provided by the
totalitarian concept of the "social interest." For EastEuropean regimes, the necessity of the party's leading
role is revealed as contingent upon particular historical
circumstances that brought the region under Soviet
domination after World War Two. The party thus appears
as merely the instrument of national subordination to aforeign power. "5
Considering that the Czechoslovak Party elite was
installed after the Prague Spring at the behest of the Soviet
Union, and combined with the fact that Gorbachev still had
not recanted the Soviet intervention, it is really not
surprising that Husak, Bilak, and other senior Party members
acted with great reserve toward the reformist course
established by Gorbachev. The desire of the political elite
was to retain rigid control in social, economic, and
political spheres. By advocating decentralization, openness,
restructuring, and pluralism, Gorbachev indirectly attacked
the "leading role" of the Party argument which had been the
ideological cornerstone of the Czechoslovak government. The
cement that held this cornerstone in place for so many years
was finally cracked not by the indigenous dissident movement
from below, or from any change in policy from the Czech
leadership, but by the General Secretary of the Soviet Union.
To comprehend the current situation in Czechoslovakia it
is necessary to review the events of 1968 and briefly
7
illustrate the aspects of the Czech Action Programme as well
as the major elements of "normalization" which was the
counteraction of the Soviet led Husak regime
.
The 1966—69 economic reform involved a substitution of
the system of central planning and management by a system of
market socialism. The basic principles of this reform were
approved by the Presidium of the CCP in September 1964, and
by the Central Committee in January of 1965. The 13th Party
Congress approved the plan in the summer of 1966. There are
several main features of the plan, or new economic model,
(NEM)
. Vladimir Kusin illustrated these as the following:
Combination of a Perspective Plan, Controlled Market
Mechanism and Autonomous Enterprises
.
In the system of central planning the driving force of
the economy was the planning center. Individual enterprises
became passive elements which carried out orders of the
center relating to both methods of production and the
composition and deliveries of output. They were rewarded
according to the degree to which they fulfilled the directive
order of the center and were removed from competitive
pressures and from the necessity of covering their production
costs through the sale of their output . The NEM involved a
combination of a perspective plan, a controlled market
mechanism and active use of monetary and fiscal policy. The
rules of the NEM were designed to shift, at least partly, the
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driving power of the economy from the center to individual
enterprises which became free to select their own methods of
production and composition of output. Individual enterprises
were to become increasingly responsible for covering their
costs, with the overall aim of maximizing "gross income."
In the NEM only a small percentage of all prices were
directly fixed by the government. Prices of most products
were to be fixed by enterprises under the supervision of the
center and were to equilibrate the market demand and supply.
Decentralization of Investment
In the case of decentralization of investment, with the
exception of strategic investments, which were reserved for
the center, normal investments were to be financed from
retained profits and bank loans.
Uniform Taxation of Enterprises
In the NEM a uniform taxation was introduced which was
based on the "gross income" of enterprises and included a six
percent capital charge, and eighteen percent gross income
tax, and a two percent tax from the value of business
inventories
.
There was also a draft bill prepared in 1968 that called
for three types of enterprises. According to Galia Golan,
these were: social, public, and those based on shares. The
social enterprise would be an autonomous unit managed by its
own direction, but within the framework of the government's
9
overall economic policy. It alone was responsible for all
its business transactions. The public enterprise was neither
autonomous nor self supporting, belonging directly to the
state. Such enterprises were limited to certain national
services such as railways, waterworks, and roads, etc. The
third type of enterprise can be considered private ownership
as small cooperatives in services.
To limit the government's interference in the function
of the market and enterprise autonomy, there was a
reorganization of the governmental economic organs.
Ministries would be controlled by placing them under a
central economic policy board. This National Economic Board
was created on April 12, 1968 as a supraministerial body.
This body would prepare the government's policies on
national economic questions, while also bearing
responsibility for "macro-aspects" of the economy. Ota Sik
stated that this measure was designed to prevent
administrative monopolies by the ministries as well as
bureaucratic delays. A number of other state organs were
reduced and modified. This included the State Planning
Commission and the Commission for Finances Prices and Wages.
Included also in this wave of reforms was the gradual
elimination of state subsidies.
Galia Golan stated that the general thrust of reforms
during the 1968 period was to strengthen the role of the
market. There were also changes in the foreign trade sector.
Convertibility of currency, the Czech koruna , was a goal, and
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there was an effort to increase Czech linkage with the world
market. This effort was not designed to decrease
participation, or withdrawal from CEMA, or even the
achievement of economic independence, but to increase the
efficiency of the total Czechoslovak economic situation.
This became an issue later when Czechoslovakia was accused of
attempting "radical" changes in not only its economy, but
changes that would disrupt the bloc economics as a whole.
The Czech reform movement, however, sought greater
cooperation between the socialist countries, and not the
reverse
.
What is ironic about many of the proposed Czech reforms
during this period is their similarity to some of the plans
and policies that Gorbachev has implemented in the Soviet
Union over the last five years. Certainly the overall goal
of economic efficiency is the same. Decentralization, worker
self management, and reorganization of at least some major
organs of the state bureaucracy are part of perestroika
,
and
they were central elements in the Prague Spring. Indeed, the
Prague Spring may have begotten the Moscow Spring.
"Asked at a press conference to explain the main
difference between Gorbachev and Alexander Dubcek,
Gennadi Gerasimov, the spokesman for the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, answered, "Nineteen years. "6
One could consider that the political and economic
reforms undertaken by the Dubcek regime were correct but
premature in implementation. It was the political reform
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that incurred the intervention in Czechoslovakia by the
Soviet Union, and other Warsaw Pact troops. In January 1968
Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as party leader and
the first public declarations were made regarding the
intention to implement reforms. Novotny had been criticized
by a reform element inside the party as well as liberal
elements from outside. In February the CPCz Presidium gave
its permission for economic plans that had been adopted in
1965 to proceed, and created a commission that was charged
with the drafting of a new Action Program. In March
personnel changes at the highest levels signified gathering
momentum for reforms. Novotny resigned as President and was
replaced by Ludvik Svoboda . Many other officials resigned or
were recalled including the Minister of Internal Affairs.
Journalists, students, and writers appealed for an amendment
to the Press Law of 1966 to end censorship. Public rallies
began in earnest demanding; rehabilitation of victims of
Stalinism, improvement of Church-state relations, and an
investigation into the death in March 1948 of Foreign
Minister Jan Masaryk. There was also an increasing number of
people advocating a federal system for Czechoslovakia. By
the end of March a CPCz session approved the principles of
Czech-Slovak federalization. In April more personnel changes
were made in the ministries and other public organizations.
Youth groups and worker's unions arose outside the official
structures .
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While reform was being implemented in Czechoslovakia,
the Soviet Union began drafting its response to the changes.
Critical comments were made by the Soviet Union regarding
reform at the Warsaw pact summit in March, while in April the
Soviet Union asked Prague to allow Soviet/WTO military
maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory in June.
In May the idea of self-management was added by the
Czechoslovak leadership to the economic reform package.
There was disagreement between Czechoslovak conservatives and
the reform element of the party about the reforms. The
public, however, overwhelmingly supported the new wave of
reforms
. Soviet displeasure with the Czechoslovak program
became acute in May. Soviet generals asserted the USSR's
"readiness" to help "the sound forces of the CPCz" by
military means if asked. Throughout the month Soviet
officers including Marshal Grechko visited Czechoslovakia in
preparation for Soviet exercises.
In June the party leadership abolished censorship,
advocated a new foreign policy, stressing "friendly" East-
West relations, and began a review of party statutes. In
June and July the international situation between
Czechoslovakia and the other members of the Warsaw pact,
excluding Romania, worsened. From July 29 to August 1
negotiations took place between the Presidiums of the CPCz
and the CPSU in the small town of Cierna pri Cope. Although
the Czech leadership felt that a compromise had been reached,
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this was not the case. The Soviet Union with Polish, East
German, Bulgarian, and. Hungarian troops invaded
Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, and ended the Prague
Spring
.
The political discourse in 1967—68 Czechoslovakia
revolved mainly around such points as the role of the party,
separation of party and state, the possibility of an
opposition, and the status of Slovakia. It was the question
about the role of the party that was the most important
.
"According to the Action Program, the party would not
command or 'rule over society' nor replace the social
and political institutions, whichrepresented the varied
interests and groups within society
. . . and that the
party should play the role of arbitrator, seeking a
method of satisfying various interests, while not
sacrificing the interest of the whole society. "7
Golan added that;
".
. .in addition to the party’s programmatic function
it should coordinate 'the practical efforts of the people
to ensure the implementation of the party's line
. . .the difference was the way in which the party was to
carry out this function. As the party was not to command
and was to abandon its monopoly on power, it was to
exercise its authority by way of example and persuasion
without benefit of the cadre system, intimidation, or
coercion .
"
8
There were proposals to control the power of the party by
adjusting the idea of democratic centralism to permit inner-
party democracy. Debate and discussion of conflicting views
would be part of the norm, while elections within the party
would have to be democratized via secret ballot. The party
statutes, drafted after the Action Program sought to provide
a new democratic framework for party activities, placing
14
emphasis more on the rights of members and participation than
on duties and discipline. Guarantees were provided such as:
the right of a member to resign, and to be present at all
proceedings against him, accessibility of information,
limitation of terms of office for elected officials, and
secret ballot
. Discussion included an argument for a system
of separation of power which would serve as a safeguard
against monopolization of power.
"Dubcek and Smrkovsky recognized that freedom of
expression would not be enough, and that democracy could
be promised only through a functioning system of
effective institutions dividing the executive, judiciary,
and legislature, independent of the party and 'open in
every respect to control and criticism. "9
The liberals urged a return to the rule of law as the
best safeguard against abuse of power. They demanded the
federalization of political, social, and governmental bodies.
The Federal parliament would consist of a house based on the
one man one vote principle, and a second house composed of
equal representatives of both the Czech lands and Slovakia.
Concerning foreign policy, the Czech regime continually
repeated its commitment to the Warsaw Pact, while also
asserting the need for mutual respect of sovereignty and
equality within the socialist camp to permit each country to
develop socialism according to its specific conditions--
separate roads to socialism. Dubcek also spoke of another
point, which was a "return to Europe" policy. This meant the
recognition of Czechoslovakia as part of Europe, and the
15
pursuit of normal relations as well as cooperation with the
European states, despite social systems.
The Prague Spring, an experiment in "socialism with a
human face" had three basic aims. These were: political
liberalization of the Stalinist model, economic
liberalization, which would create an atmosphere where the
economy could perform with a greater degree of autonomy and
efficiency, and lastly, the federalization of the national
system, which would grant greater equality to the Slovak
minority. Volgyes wrote that;
"at the heart of the matter of these reforms lay the goal
of political liberalization
.
"10 Yet, it was precisely this,
and the pluralism which began to emerge in Czechoslovakia
that was considered a challenge by the Soviet Union. The
Soviet leadership decided to curtail the Czechoslovak
experiment before it "infected" other members of the WTO.
Consequently, the Soviet Union and other members of the WTO
invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and within two years,
most of the reforms undertaken by the reformist element of
the Czech Communist Party were eliminated. Slovakia did
achieve greater autonomy under the federal system. The
Soviet crackdown in 1968 leads to the next chapter of
Czechoslovak history, known as "normalization."
NORMALIZATION 1969-1989:
To the Soviets, the process of normalization meant
"the complete exposure and stamping out of the subversive
activities of the right-wing, anti-socialist forces
16
. . .and the resolute strengthening of the leading role
of the Communist Party in the activities of the state
agencies, in the ideological and public spheres,
. . .in
the whole life of the country
.
By treaty, 60,000-70,000 Soviet troops were stationed in
Czechoslovakia, the entire reformist leadership was driven
from office, and the Czechoslovak Communist Party was purged.
This purge effectively stifled any effort at reform by
removing anyone who was thought to have such tendencies from
any office or position where they might communicate their
beliefs, and thereby have an impact upon other members of
society. Hans Renner reported that for seven months
Screening Commissions interviewed over 1.5 million Party
members. 150,000 communists voluntarily left the CPCz . Some
326,000 people were refused new Party cards, and the total
losses to the CPCz was roughly 28 percent of its membership.
The media, which had enjoyed considerable freedom during the
Prague Spring was dealt with severely. Newspapers were
closed, Rude Pravo lost 45 of 80 editors, and one out of two
journalists lost their jobs.
"In Czechoslovakia over 900 professors (out of about
3,500) were dismissed, and the Czechoslovak Academy of
Sciences fared no better, losing roughly 1,200 scholars,
and closing five departments . . .30 percent of the
full-time officials of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary
Trade Union had to leave, 40 percent of the economic
managers had to step down, as did 30 percent of the
commanding officers in the army and police. Nearly
14,000 Party officials and other paid employees were
dismissed from Party ranks. "12
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Between 250,000 and 300,000 people left Czechoslovakia as
direct victims of these purges. These were professional
people such as doctors, educators, and other professionals.
The resulting consequences, according to Hans Renner were
"quite disastrous."
"The almost complete stagnation and even regression of
social life in the 1970s and early 1980s are
. . .due to
the purges . "13
The enthusiasm and optimism of the Prague Spring gave
way to political apathy and passivity, which was encouraged
by the Husak regime. Depoliticization was encouraged in two
ways; harsh repression of all opposition through arrests and
trials, and an attempt to increase the standard of living to
thwart possible unrest. Normalization continued well into the
late nineteen eighties, even after the deaths of three
conservative Soviet leaders and the replacement of Gustav
Husak by Milos Jakes in 1987 as Secretary General.
However, in 1985 Gorbachev became the General Secretary
of the Soviet Union, and along with his ascent to power began
the dual policies of change: perestroika, and glasnost. As
a result, changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies
have taken place, giving East-Central Europe more flexibility
to implement their domestic policies, and greater latitude in
foreign relations. Gorbachev himself reinforced the idea at
the Strasbourg Speech on July 6, 1989. The speech, addressed
18
to a parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe
contained an important message to both "reformers" and public
of East-Central Europe.
"The fact that the states of Europe belong to a different
social system is a reality. The recognition of this
historical fact and respect for the sovereign right of
each people to choose their social system at their own
discretion are the most important prerequisites for a
process leading to a normal Europe
. The social and
political order in some countries did change in the past,
and it can change in the future as well, but this is a
matter for the people themselves, and of their choosing.
Any interference in the internal affairs, any attempt to
limit the sovereignty of another state--friend and ally,
or any other--would be inadmissible. The philosophy
behind the concept of a common European home excludes
the likelihood of an armed clash and the very possibility
of the use or threat of force, above all military
force . "14
Although this was a strong statement with concerning the
"separate road to socialism" question, the initial signal for
change in the Soviet Union came much earlier. Gorbachev
stated that at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting the "concrete
strategy for further economic development and a plan of
action" was initiated. The ultimate goal was overall
economic improvement
.
"The principle priorities are known to lie . . . in a
profound structural reorganization of the economy, in
reconstruction of its material base, in new technologies,
in investment policy changes, and in high management
standards . "15
Change was not to be limited to merely the economic sector.
A radical change throughout Soviet society was to begin.
19
Gorbachev wrote that
:
"The economy has been and remains our main concern. But
at the same time we have set about changing the moral and
psychological situation in society. We have come to the
conclusion that unless we activate the human factor
. .it will be impossible for us to accomplish any of
the tasks set, or to change the situation in the
country . " 16
Gorbachev's campaign for perestroika is a call for
extensive departures from prevailing practices and norms.
His tenure as leader of the Soviet Union has been
characterized by his pragmatic rather than ideological
approach to social, political, economic, and international
problems. This is reflected somewhat in the change from his
original rhetoric that called for acceleration, (uskorenie) r
to the focus on restructuring, (perestroika
)
,
of Soviet
economics and society. The need for radical change drove
decisions due to the complexity of the problems faced by the
Soviet Union. By the January 1987 Plenum of the Central
Committee it became evident that economic progress and social
renewal ultimately depended upon political democratization.
The openness or ( glasnost ) aspect of the "new thinking" was
designed to include a more educated middle class in public
life. Glasnost can be considered a symbol of trust, and
reflects the leadership's change in political outlook that
only a small elite, or vanguard could be trusted with the
truth. Tatyana Zaslavskaya wrote that "the truth cannot be
hidden if one is to expect cooperation" [from the populace]
.
Gorbachev went to great lengths to address mistakes made in
20
the past by Stalin and other Soviet leaders. An example is
the rehabilitations of "nonpersons" like Nicolai Bukharin.
Some parts of perestroika can be tied to the 1983
Novosibirsk Economic Report, which addressed the fact that
the structure of industry had changed since the 1930s and
that this system was obsolete and an obstacle to economic
developments. The Soviet Union under the leadership of
Mikhail Gorbachev has identified the myriad of political and
economic problems that plague the country and has begun the
slow painstaking process of economic revitalization. It has
combined this process with more "openness" in Soviet society,
an acknowledgement of past mistakes by Soviet leadership, and
closer political and economic cooperation with Western Europe
and the United States
.
For the Stalinist leadership in Prague Gorbachev's new
thinking was anathema. The ideas and proposals that
Gorbachev espoused were painfully similar to those of the
Prague Spring and contradicted the Czechoslovak normalization
program. Consequently, the Czechoslovak leadership was left
not knowing how to respond to the radical shift in Soviet
policies. Despite public statements to the contrary, neither
Gustav Husak nor Milos Jakes fully accepted "Gorbachevian"
reform measures, nor did they carry out implement substantive
reforms that would address needed economic problems. The
Czechoslovak government finally announced support for reform
and cautiously embarked on an economic reform.
21
This process of reform or renewal did not begin
immediately in Czechoslovakia. As a direct result of Soviet
action during the Prague Spring, the leadership in Prague was
first openly hostile to implementing the reforms advocated
by Gorbachev, and only after it realized that Gorbachev was
going to retain power did the Czech regime begin
"experimenting" with Soviet-style reforms.
22
CHAPTER 2
THE REACTION TO PERESTROIKA
From 1985 to 1989 the Communist regime, led first by
Gustav Husak, and then by Milos Jakes remained the most
politically repressive regime in East-Central Europe
excluding Romania. The reaction to Gorbachev's promotion of
perestroika and glasnost by most members of the Czechoslovak
leadership was negative despite official statements to the
contrary that appeared in Rude Pravo, Radio Prague
,
and other
sources. Perestroika and glasnost were diametric opposites
of the Czechoslovak "normalization" policy, and the Communist
government never actually figured a way to accept the "new
Soviet thinking, " maintain strict adherence to Marxist-
Leninist orthodoxy, address growing economic and political
problems, and sustain its legitimacy simultaneously. The
Czechoslovak reaction to Soviet reforms moved over a period
of several years from a position of absolute negativity to
one of reluctant acquiescence. Even this was only in the
economic sector
.
Neil Malcolm wrote that for years the Soviet Union
sought to maintain tight control over Eastern Europe for
three reasons. The three justifications for this policy
were: the region was viewed as a vital part of the "world
socialist economy, " it provided evidence of the vitality and
potential expansion of the Soviet system, which, in turn,
23
bolstered the domestic authority and foreign prestige of the
Soviet Union, lastly, it was perceived as an indespensible
security asset that would ensure the division of Germany and
a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and NATO. Gorbachev
realized that these three elements of Soviet foreign policy
toward East-Central Europe needed modification to reinforce
his policies of perestroika and glasnost
,
and began changing
the Soviet position toward these states. His foreign policy
became more flexible toward the area and both directly and
indirectly encouraged similar changes for it
. Very early
after Gorbachev attained power questions emerged regarding
the "limits of reform" in East-Central Europe. Initially,
the main question was whether the Soviet Union would allow
similar changes in East-Central Europe despite the
possibility of these changes going beyond what the Soviet
government planned. This question has moved from one about
the reform of a socialist model to one of how to implement a
market economy largely due to Gorbachev's initial shift in
foreign policy toward the area. It was Gorbachev who started
the pendulum swinging in the direction of reform in the
Soviet Union, and this overlapped into East-Central Europe.
The Czechoslovak government showed no sign of allowing
political liberalization or tolerance of political dissent
and was a major reason the Communist regime collapsed in
November/December 1989. The Czechoslovak Communist Party
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went from not reacting to not having the ability to react
fast enough to increasing and unrelenting demands for
political change.
While the Czechoslovak government hedged, stalled, and
finally plodded along with some limited economic change, the
Soviet Union proceeded with proposals for democratization and
an array of economic programs, laws, and procedures that
resembled closely the Czech Action Program of the Prague
Spring. (*See Appendix 1) The Soviet Union, which was the
very model upon which the Czechoslovak system was based,
began to change. In both domestic and international politics
Gorbachev relied less on ideology and more on pragmatic
decision making and diplomacy. The Czechoslovak government
was left puzzled about how to deal with such radical shifts
in policies from the "center of empire."
The most visible reaction to Gorbachev's policies by the
Czechoslovak leadership was in economics. It would be
incorrect to say that the Czechoslovak economic planners
"used" the Soviet ideas of perestroika as a model, but it
could be argued that more pragmatic economists such as
Lubomir Strougal were encouraged by Moscow's reform posture
and at least the possibility of a structural reform. They
could point to Soviet changes as evidence for a need to
address local economic difficulties, and thereby challenge
the party "hardliners." What happened gradually was a split
between two groups that can be called as "normalizers" like
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Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra and "pragmatists" such as Leopold
Ler, Valtr Komarek, and Lubomir Strougal. The "pragmatists"
concerned themselves less with ideology and more with dealing
with the growing economic difficulties of the Czechoslovak
system
.
Just four months after Gorbachev came to power Gustav
Husak announced at the Czechoslovak Central Committee meeting
that ;
"We will not take the road of any of the market oriented
concepts that would weaken the system of socialist
collective property and the party's leading role in the
economy. We have had a bad experience with that kind of
thing .
"
17
This statement illustrated two important points, the
first was that despite a new leader in the Kremlin who was
proposing a radically new political, social, and economic
agenda, it did not automatically spell similar changes for
Czechoslovakia. Secondly, it illustrated the fact that the
regime hesitated enacting any type of reform mainly due to
the adverse historical experience of the Prague Spring. Very
early it was evident that the Czechoslovak leadership was
fearful of a "return to 1968." Their belief was that once
economic reforms were adopted there would be popular demands
for more "liberal" political reform in other sectors. This
of course would be unacceptable to those occupying Hradcany
Castle. This trepidation regarding a "return to 1968" guided
the outlook and position of the Czechoslovak government until
it was replaced by the Civic Forum government in 1989.
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There was speculation from Western analysts that during
Husak's meeting with Gorbachev in May of 1985 Husak must have
convinced the new Soviet leader that a continuation of the
normalization policy that Czechoslovakia had been following
since the aftermath of the Prague Spring was necessary.
"Husak visited the Soviet leader at the end of May and a
reiteration of the anti-reformist policy must now be
presumed to have been cleared by Moscow
. . .Husak's
plea for a continuation rather than innovation must have
been convincing enough to be accepted in Moscow." 18
The Czechoslovak reaction may have also been influenced
by some of Gorbachev's statements regarding Solidarity in
Poland and the Kadar regime in Hungary. On the one hand,
Gorbachev stated that there would be "no new Solidarity-like"
institutions formulated in the bloc, while he spoke favorably
of the Hungarian reform efforts. Although the Solidarity
issue was more politically charged than the Hungarian one, it
pointed to the fact that at least initially, Gorbachev
probably lacked aaffected clear picture of how to deal with
the rest of the bloc, and at least not formulated a uniform
foreign policy line toward East-Central Europe. This, in
turn, could have impacted negatively on the Czech decision
about whether or not to reform. The Czechoslovak leadership
probably felt that lunging into a reform was unnecessary.
Obviously it would not make much sense for Gorbachev to
destabilize the Czechoslovak regime that had a precarious
legitimacy at best by insisting upon rapid change. Gorbachev
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was probably waiting to solidify his power base at home
before enacting sweeping changes and demanding a "break with
the past" from others.
There is another point to be made in that if perestroika
was going to succeed it needed "support" from the Soviet
Union's major trading partners, e.g., the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries. They, in turn would
have to modify their policies to realign themselves not only
ideologically, but also economically with the Soviet Union.
Lastly, East-Central Europe had seen a similar Soviet
reformer before in the persona of Nikita Khrushchev. The
Czechoslovak regime did not want to repeat the mistake of
introducing a reform that might go beyond the Soviet limits
(whatever those were) . The conservatives in Czechoslovakia
sought to wait out the Soviet leader. They wanted to see
whether he would either be driven from power or if he would
modify his position. The "wait and see" policy adopted by
the Czechoslovak leadership led, in part, to its ouster.
In 1985 Czechoslovakia was intolerant of any political
dissent or challenge to the Communist Party whether real or
imagined. Members of Charter 77 like Jiri Dienstbier and
Vaclav Havel were watched closely by the police, and often
jailed for "hooliganism." Rude' Pravo continued its diatribe
against the Catholic Church by increasing anti-church
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propaganda for the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St.
Methodius. A letter sent by the Pope for the event was
referred to as "a threat to the socialist consciousness."
In economics, Gustav Husak merely issued bland
statements requesting more "resolute actions" by the party
while offering no tangible solutions. There were some
economists that could see the need for economic change, and
among these was Valtr Komarek, who, in the journal Politicka
Ekonomie wrote that a fundamental change in economics was
needed and that the present "extensive" model, dating back to
post World War II was an anachronism. Komarek maintained
that part of Czechoslovakia's economic problem was its
continued concentration on heavy industry. One of his
suggestions was to transfer resources to other sectors. The
regime, however, had no desire to follow Komarek '
s
suggestions. In July, Husak flatly denied that
Czechoslovakia would embark on similar reforms. Further
statements made by the Chairman of the State Planning
Commission, Svatopluk Potac, were indicative of negativism to
economic change. Potac was quoted as having said that;
"during the next five year plan Czechoslovakia would take
no risks and that some people might call this
conservative, but we call it stable, dynamic
development .
"
19
Early in 1986 conservatives in the Czechoslovak regime
redoubled their efforts in denouncing promoters of Soviet
style reforms by raising the spectre of the Prague Spring of
1968. The most prominent and most outspoken anti-reformer
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was Vasil Bilak, the Communist Party's leading ideologist.
Bilak epitomized strict Marxist—Leninist orthodoxy and
opposed any departure from it. His position was derived from
the Lessons from the Crisis in Party and Society after the
13th CPCz Congress 1966." This document was the backbone of
the normalization program and Bilak sought strict adherence
to it. Specific guidelines included: the guarantee of the
leading role of the Party, the state acting as an instrument
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxist-Leninist
orthodoxy reigning supreme to the exclusion of every other
view, collective ownership and central planning, and
proletarian internationalism, especially with regard to the
USSR.
Throughout the early months of 1986 up to the XVIIth CPCz
Congress, Bilak continually denounced any thought of reform
and asserted that the solution to the problems faced by
Czechoslovakia in economics "lay in precisely the opposite
direction." He felt that more planning was needed, and an
emphasis should be placed on "the human factor."
Evidence of anti-reform manifested itself at the XVIIth
Party Congress. Husak and others commented critically
regarding the Soviet XXVIIth Party Congress which was held
one month earlier. In one of Husak 's speeches he said that;
"We follow what they are doing in the Soviet Union and
• ? 0look for our own solutions."
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This was a polite signal to the Soviet leadership that
Czechoslovakia would not adopt the Soviet model. It was at
this Soviet Congress that Gorbachev spoke for over five hours
about perestroika
r advocating "sweeping changes" and radical
economic reform. His proposals included: more autonomy for
local farm and plant managers, a revision of the entire
pricing system, a revision of the food tax that had been in
effect during the 1921-29 period, and placing operations on a
more self supporting basis. He assured the congress that
these measures and others like them were not a retreat from
socialism, but an improvement in it. This view was not
shared by the Prague leadership.
Although Husak said that his regime was "not afraid of
reforms" and that "We follow what they are doing in the
Soviet Union and we look for our own solutions, " it did not
look like genuine reform would be undertaken by the Prague
leadership. Radio Free Europe Research pointed out that;
"It now seems certain that the Czechoslovak leadership has
not chosen to follow the Soviet example in enforcing
large scale personnel changes in party districts and
, ... 91
regions, nor in the ministries."
It also wrote that any mention of reform was couched in
language that left no doubt about the regime's vigilance
towards improvement, rejection of market solutions and a
weakening of the leading role of the Party. Husak' s speech
at the XVI Ith Party Congress concentrated on two main points:
an improvement in planning, and economic growth acceleration.
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A striking feature of his speech was that the word "reform"
was used at all. It had disappeared from the political
vocabulary during the normalization period and its usage was
considered taboo. However, the fact that Husak used the term
illustrated the fact that the regime might be willing to
modify its position.
Whereas Gorbachev launched into perestroika by
eliminating some elements of the bureaucracy and replacing
"conservatives" in the highest governing organs, none of this
happened in Czechoslovakia preceding, during, or immediately
after the XVIIth Congress. No one lost their posts in either
the Presidium or the secretariat
.
"Compared to the remarkably fresh notes struck at the
XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU just concluded in Moscow,
the Prague Party event mainly distinguished itself by its
lassitude and its caution. So far, everything stayed the
way it was .
"
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The Economist wrote that;
"...formidable obstacles in the entrenched economic and
political ideological apparatus remain, and a really
effective reform, which would signal an important
departure in post-1968 Czechoslovakia looks unlikely at
present because it would require more extensive political
changes than the Husak regime can tolerate." 23
An official shift in Czechoslovak economic policy came in
December 1986 when, at a session of the Central Committee of
the CPCz
,
Husak announced the government's intention of
carrying out a Soviet style "restructuring." In January 1987
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the basic principles of this restructuring program were
published by Hospodarske Noviny
.
The document on
restructuring was titled; "The Concret ization of the
Principles of Restructuring of the Economic Mechanism of the
CSSR, " and contained 37 principles. Although this document
suggested that the regime was making some progress away from
orthodoxy since there was a proposed shift in the
relationship between central agencies and enterprises. There
was no plan to implement mechanisms to effect proposed
changes
.
One of the most significant points of the restructuring
document was that central planning bodies were to concentrate
on the strategic issues of modernization, overall economic
balance, and regional development. It was reported that the
extent of central administrative direction would be reduced
"drastically .
"
A second important feature of this document was it
contained a proposal for a law on Socialist Enterprises. It
provided that enterprises would be fully self sufficient, and
would no longer receive subsidies. Enterprises would become
the "basic economic units" responsible for planning their own
development . They would have more control in shaping their
internal structure and links with their partners and their
emphasis would become addressing societal needs. In addition
to the above, planning organizations would establish binding,
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long term objectives called "normatives . " These were a range
of a given performance indicator within which companies
operate rather than having to meet a definite target.
By looking at this document outside of historical
context, it could be inferred that the Czechoslovak regime
had embraced some Soviet style economic reforms. However,
upon closer scrutiny this assumption is not entirely
accurate
.
Radio Free Europe Research wrote that;
"It is virtually inconceivable that Gustav Husak's and
Vasil Bilak's "normalization" regime would be capable of
carrying out a major reform of the present day orthodox
system .
"
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They further wrote that the document must, above all, be seen
as the regime's response to the need to assimilate
Gorbachev's new philosophy. Failure to respond could have
prompted the Kremlin to demand personnel changes at the top.
The attempt made by the Czechoslovak government to "mimic"
Gorbachevism even though it had no intention of embracing
substantive reforms was viewed as a way to survive.
The document did not deal with the most pertinent
issues, which were identified as the restructuring of the
central planning and ministerial bureaucracies, and the fact
that even though a "drastic" reduction in central direction
was announced, there was no indication of how the power of
entrenched bureaucracies would be reduced. The "Principles"
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illustrate the desirability of identifying non-productive
enterprises and industries, however, it does not mention the
abolishing of "justified social security" of workers. This
meant that the regime would not approve of measures that
would lead to unemployment. As a consequence, no genuine
industrial restructuring could be carried out because it
would close inefficient factories and other non-productive
enterprises, thus generating some unemployment.
By early 1987 there was evidence of polarization in the
Czechoslovak leadership concerning Czechoslovakia's process
of change. Lubomir Strougal began to criticize the caution
of the normalization period by attributing it to an
"inadequate level of knowledge" and "our rigid and dogmatic
view of several theoretical problems of political economy."
He issued statements seeking a revision of the regime's
economic policies. These incorporated "positive" elements of
the 1968 program of reforms, which, offered some form of
rehabilitation of the 1968 program. Regarding the 13th
Congress of the CPCz, Strougal said that;
"...it contained a number of valuable elements that could
• • ? sbe used and developed in practice."
Strougal began using the words "reform" and
"restructuring" interchangeably in some of his speeches, and
he drew comparisons between the planned Czechoslovak reform
and Gorbachev's restructuring efforts in the Soviet Union.
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It is not at all accidental that the concept of our
reform is in its basic features identical with the aims
pursued also by the Soviet comrades in their
restructuring.
"
26
Two distinct factions operated inside the Czechoslovak
leadership. Lubomir Strougal and other economists promoted
genuine economic reform (within socialism)
,
while Vasil Bilak
and other conservatives remained opposed to substantive
change
. Husak seems to have chosen the middle course at
first but at last realized that the pressure from the Soviet
Union for change was too great and began to endorse
"Gorbachevian" reforms for Czechoslovakia. It is no
accident, however, that Husak asserted that Czechoslovakia
would follow the Soviet lead and effect the biggest changes
in economic management since the period of nationalization in
the post World War II era less than one month before
Gorbachev was due to arrive in Prague for a state visit
.
Some analysts concluded that Husak was simply paying lip
service to Gorbachev's policies in order to appease the
Soviet leader, and thereby retain power. Evidence supports
the fact that the Czechoslovak regime was inclined to attempt
some economic reforms, but nothing to the extent of those
being proposed and enacted in the Soviet Union. The
Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the basic outline
of reform was similar to the current Soviet one, and the
Czechoslovak example in the 1960s. Focus was upon enterprise
autonomy, ending central directive planning, granting some
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foreign trade rights to enterprises, and some small private
enterprise. Despite the leadership's promotion of economic
reform, opposition to reform came from three areas:
ideological opponents from within the Communist Party, the
conservative state apparatus, and an apathetic and cynical
workforce. The overall trend into the late 1980s was that
economic growth fell well below the 3 . 5% yearly targets
.
Table 1: Economic Growth Percents 1986-1989
1986 2 .
6
1987 2.2
1988 2.3
1989 1 .
9
These figures represent Net Material Product (NMP )
.
They do not include health, education, public administration,
defense, banking, hotels, and personal services.
The Economist Intelligence Unit also stated that there was
evidence in the consumer goods and heavy engineering sectors
of concealed inflation.
"Enterprises present marginal improvements as radically
new products for which they are allowed by central
authorities to charge higher prices, giving the
appearance in the statistics of an increase in output.
When these factors are taken into account, growth in the
1980s may appear to have been an illusion." 27
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Even though the Czechoslovak government viewed
Gorbachev's policies negatively, the popular reaction was
quite different. Many people were hopeful that Gorbachev
would be a catalyst for political change. Dissidents
expressed both hope and skepticism about Gorbachev. There
was no debating the popular reaction to Gorbachev during his
visit in April 1987. The general public in Czechoslovakia
cheered the Soviet leader in a genuine and spontaneous show
of affection.
Even prior to Gorbachev's visit, the Czechoslovak public
showed a great deal of interest in what was happening inside
the Soviet Union. Newspapers and journals carrying excerpts
from Gorbachev's speeches and the new management proposals of
perestroika were sold out immediately. Hans Renner stated
that various Czechoslovak dissidents, and particularly the
ex-reformists, began to compare the reforms in the Soviet
Union with the reform process at the time of the Prague
Spring
.
"They saw a kindred spirit in Gorbachev, somebody striving
for the same goals in Moscow which they themselves had
tried to realize in Prague twenty years earlier." °
The comparison was not limited to only Czechoslovak
observers. An article from the Christian Science Monitor
wrote that
:
"Many of the substantive reforms are very similar: the
economic changes; reducing the party's role in day to day
management; a more significant legislature; freer public
debate; and a more independent legal system." 29
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Charles Gati reinforced the point about popular
expectations in Czechoslovakia when he stated that:
"Czechoslovakia is an anachronism in Gorbachev's world of
reform and renewal
. . .people in Prague hope that
Gorbachev's Moscow Spring, whose origins they often trace
to Dubcek ' s Prague Spring, will produce beneficial
changes in Czechoslovakia." 30
Gorbachev spoke with people in the streets of Prague, and
was greeted with cheers, red carnations, and Czechoslovaks
waving Soviet flags. It was probably the most enthusiastic
response from the Czechoslovak people to a Soviet leader in
the history of the country. The Western Press reported that
there were comments from the crowd such as: "He is our only
hope" and "We want him to stay." One woman interviewed by
McLean's reflected the skepticism of some when she said;
"He will have enough trouble implementing his own program
at home, never mind here!" 31
Although members of Charter 77 were disappointed that
the topics of 1968 and the prospect of Soviet troops
withdrawals were not addressed, some, like Jiri Hajek,
Czechoslovakia's former Foreign Minister, viewed the visit
positively, and expressed 'cautious optimism' for future
reforms in Czechoslovakia.
During this visit Gorbachev reinforced the notion that
there could be some flexibility in the bloc with regard to
foreign and domestic policies. Gorbachev widened the margin
for autonomous action by other members of the bloc saying
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The"no communist party has a monopoly on the truth" .32
Czechoslovak government never took this as a sign that they
might begin to implement meaningful and substantive reforms.
Some "tinkering" went on with the economy, but the most
important change for Czechoslovakia came late in the year.
On December 17, at the 7th Session of the CPCz Central
Committee meeting, Gustav Husak was released from his duties
as Secretary General and took the ceremonial post of
President of the Republic. Milos Jakes replaced Husak and
almost immediately reported that the change in leadership did
not mean that party policies would be changed.
During Jakes tenure from December 1987 to December 1989,
two main currents dominated the political situation in
Czechoslovakia. First, rising social unrest and frustration
with a regime that was almost wholly unresponsive to societal
needs increased substantially. Secondly, the regime fought
the increasing demands for both religious freedom, and
"glasnost" by using police coercion and harassment of those
individuals or groups that dared speak out . The Czechoslovak
regime under Milos Jakes sought to maintain tight control on
society while absolutely refusing to tolerate any challenge
to the leading role of the communist party.
Part of the reason for the increase in dissident
activity, protests, and religious gatherings was due to the
fact that 1988 was an important anniversary year in
Czechoslovak history. It was the 20th anniversary of
the Prague Spring, the 40th anniversary of the communist
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takeover, the 50th anniversary of the Munich Agreement, and
the 70th anniversary of independence. For the Prague
leadership the most difficult of these dates to deal with was
the 1968 Prague Spring. Throughout the year they spent
considerable effort in denying that it was similar to reforms
being proposed in Czechoslovakia and denouncing those that
were involved in the Prague Spring; like Alexander Dubcek
.
The effort to distance the current "reform" from the one in
1968 began in earnest early in January. Radio Prague said
that any comparison of perestroika with events of 1968 was
"an offense to truth and human reason." Rude Pravo wrote
that ;
"people pretending to support 'restructuring' are
comparing the CPCz Central Committee effort of 1968 to
today. These cases are incomparable . . . " 33
The Jakes regime was extremely reluctant to reassess the
events of the Prague Spring due to the fact that it derived
its legitimacy from the repudiation of the Prague Spring and
from the normalization policies that followed after it had
been suppressed. The party, under the leadership of Milos
Jakes, never reconciled this fact with the populace, and the
two years of his rule were marked with protests,
demonstrations, and widespread popular support for adopting
Soviet-style reforms.
The Jakes regime made no attempts to coordinate economic
change with political change. In sharp contrast to
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Gorbachev, the CPCz sought to "revive" the economy without
political concessions. Radio Prague and Rude Pravo were
replete with statements stressing that economic reforms did
not mean more leeway for dissidents, and that in no way would
political opposition be legalized. Czechoslovakia's economic
situation continually worsened while the regime hesitated
implementing major reforms. Ladislav Adamec, the new Prime
Minister assessed the economic situation as "grim." The
growth rates of both national income and the overall economy
did not reach targeted levels, while the earlier
experimentation with a few hundred enterprises produced
little reason for optimism. There was no significant retreat
from central planning methods. Czechoslovakia also suffered
from its own investment policies. It continued to produce
heavy machinery for sale in the Soviet Union. However, the
Soviets were cancelling foreign orders as part of its own
reform effort. Czechoslovakia actually ran a trade deficit
with noncommunist countries in the first three quarters of
1988 .
The Party's solution to these problems was a call for
increased reorganization and "activism" under its control.
The CPCz Central Committee meeting on April 8-9, 1988
increased rhetoric demanding the mobilization of society, and
the party, but announced no genuine implementation of a
reform. The CPCz rejected the idea that the party should
reduce its role in economic decision-making, and although
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some changes in party personnel took place, it did not change
the overall economic policy. Vladimir Kusin wrote that;
"The CPCz continues to follow the reformist track that
carries the least risk of political change, and rests on
economic reorganization combined with enforced
invigoration of the party." 34
The regime seemed content with a slow pace of economic
change
. In October Radio Free Europe Research pointed out
that very few of the elements of Soviet perestroika and
glasnost had been transported to Czechoslovakia. In that
same month Jakes gave a speech at the CPCz Central Committee
Plenum indicating that there would be no acceleration of
reformist plans. Lubomir Strougal, the leading voice for
genuine Soviet-style reforms lost his position as Prime
Minister and was replaced by Ladislav Adame c . This indicated
that the conservative element in the Czechoslovak leadership
had prevailed and that Jakes was able to reinforce his
leadership team.
Although the prospects for any real economic
restructuring were dim during this period, the prospects for
tolerance of dissent or opposition by the regime were almost
non-existent. Steady economic deterioration contributed to
the increase in human rights activities and political dissent
during 1988-1989. The regime was more than willing to use
force to assert its domination over Czechoslovak society.
One noteworthy development for Czechoslovakia were the
increasing religious demands of Roman Catholics . Religion
became one of the only alternatives, an "escape 1 really, for
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a politically repressed, and apathetic society. The
government recognized this fact, and increased its steps to
thwart efforts of secular leaders to provide for the people
who wanted spiritual relief. Christians in Czechoslovakia
continued to be exposed to strong anti-religious propaganda
and persecution. Cardinal Tomasek was not allowed to publish
his works inside Czechoslovakia. The government refused to
allow the Vatican to take part in assigning clergy to fill
vacancies. In some cases ones that were filled were not
allowed to practice. Popular priests were often transferred
or were harassed in other ways
.
"Priests responsible for driving up to nine parishes lost
their driver's licenses for alcoholism from the wine used
during Holy Communion". 35
Some religious believers like Augustin Navratil, the author
of the 31 point petition for more religious freedom, were
interrogated and assigned to psychiatric clinics. On March 6
over 8000 Catholics attended a mass at St. Vitus Cathedral in
Prague to honor Blessed Agnes of Bohemia. The Czech secret
police detained various political and religious activists,
and banned them from attending the mass. Among these were:
Charter 77 activist Vaclav Havel, Catholic leaders Vaclav
Benda and Vaclav Maly, and members of a music organization
called the Jazz Section; Karel Srp, and Cestmir Hunat
.
Later in March a religious demonstration in Bratislava by
several thousand Slovak Catholics was broken up by riot
police
.
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Demonstrations and gatherings were not limited to
® igions occasions
. On August 21 1988/ 10, 000 people
gathered to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the crushing
of the Prague Spring. On October 28, 5,000 people marched in
Prague to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Czechoslovak
independence. On December 10, 4,000 people gathered for
International Human Rights Day. In each case the crowds were
met by truncheon wielding riot police.
Independent political activity rose during 1988 and 1989
and various groups increasingly criticized the regime.
"Until the beginning of 1988, active opposition to the
Czechoslovak regime had been limited to several dissident
groups whose impact
. . .had been rather limited." 36
Radio Free Europe Research pointed out that there were
about twenty dissident associations in Czechoslovakia,
covering a wide variety of ideas and political philosophies.
Two main sources of "recruits" for the new dissident groups
came largely from Roman Catholics, who increasingly demanded
more religious freedom, and disenchanted youth.
"There is growing resentment and an increasing
willingness among Roman Catholics to demand their rights
. .
.more than 600,000 of them signed a petition for more
religious freedom in 1988.
"
37
In the demonstrations that had taken place on August 21,
October 28, and December 10, many of the demonstrators were
younger people who had not previously belonged to any formal
dissident group.
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In April 1988, an organization called the Independent
Peace Association distributed samizdat literature calling for
"a demilitarized socialism, and greater openness in all areas
of life." Less than a year later a "club" comprised of
former senior party officials was formed in Prague, titled:
Obroda (renewal) : A Club for Socialist Restructuring."
This group consisted of some people who had acted in the
Prague Spring and included: Cestmir Cisar, the Chairman of
the Czech National Council and Secretary of the CPCz
Presidium in 1968, Jiri Hajek, the former Foreign Minister,
Vojtek Mencl, the former commanding officer of the Military
Political Academy in Prague, as well as some signatories of
Charter 77. Their declaration contained praise for both
Dubcek's policies formulated in the Action program of 1968 as
well as for Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. It
discussed the political, economic, and moral crisis in
Czechoslovakia, and expressed concern regarding the lack of
reform
.
"If the attempts at "restructuring" remain confined to
. .
.marginal problems of the system while preserving the
party's monopoly on power . . .we fear that stagnation
and decline will continue. The communist party must show
a more profoundly democratic attitude in economy,
o o
politics, and ideology. °
Naturally the official reaction to this group was
completely negative. Jakes dismissed the group as people
seeking "their own rehabilitation as well as that of their
[1968] policies." Rude Pravo criticized the formation of the
group, and described the members as "rightist opportunists
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who advocated the overthrow of the existing political
system." This group caused embarrassment for the regime due
to the fact that they not only claimed to support socialism,
but they also openly declared their support for Gorbachev.
Criticism of the regime's policies in Slovakia came from
the Slovak literary weekly, Literarny Tyzdennik
. Its
articles reflected impatience with the slow pace of reform
and criticized those who created "attitudinal,
organizational, and institutional structures that lead to a
general stagnation in society ". 39 It further reported that
the stagnation was rooted in the Brezhnev era.
Just prior to the upheaval that would remove the
communist party from power, the party attempted to define its
stand and justify the slow pace of reform. Jan Fojtik, the
chief ideologist of the Communist Party, (who had replaced
Vasil Bilak) gave a speech arguing for a "well thought out"
gradual process of change which would be implemented by a
single party leadership. They would move ahead slowly in
order to avoid problems that the Soviet Union, Hungary, and
Poland were faced with; eg. inflation, unemployment.
"Fojtik argued that perestroika was necessary because new
conditions required new approaches, but it would be
wrong to return to capitalist exploitation in pursuing it
. .
.political stability and economic balance were
preferable to haste and experimentation ." 40
Fojtik said that the CPCz welcomed change in the Soviet
Union, and explained that Czechoslovakia would be influenced
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by changes in other countries in the socialist commonwealth,
but denied that Czechoslovakia needed to strictly follow
Soviet guidelines. Fojtik's remarks indicated that the
regime was attempting to present itself as a supporter of
reforms, but that any reforms would be controlled by the
communist party.
Throughout 1988 and 1989 the Jakes regime paid pretended
interest to the idea of perestroika and glasnost occurring
inside Czechoslovakia, while repressing opposition to the
Communist Party. It did not pursue "radical reform" in the
economic sector, nor did it establish a concrete agenda for
tending to the various economic problems that the country was
facing. These economic problems when combined with the
regime’s intolerance of dissent or opposition led directly to
the crisis situation in late 1989. The regime could never
reconcile itself with the Prague Spring. This resulted in
not only the loss of its legitimacy, but also the complete
loss of confidence in the regime's ability to manage society
by the general public. On January 17 1989 a large
demonstration gathered in Prague and demanded "Free
elections, Gorbachev, freedom, the removal of Jakes, and the
release of Vaclav Havel."
The transformation of the country had begun which would,
by the end of the year, remove Jakes, make Havel the
President, promise genuine elections, and move the country
far beyond what Gorbachev would have envisioned for a
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"Czechoslovak perestroika."
After having outlined in some detail the actions of the
Czechoslovak government in light of perestroika and glasnost
the question becomes "Why, and how did Communism collapse in
this country?" Although there are several key factors
involved which have shaped the transformation from a
politically repressive, economically inefficient country to
"a more civil society, " the most important of these was
Mikhail Gorbachev. His implementation of the dual policies
of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, as well as
a shift in Soviet foreign policy and national security policy
were of major import in making the transformation of
Czechoslovakia possible. Timothy Colton wrote that;
"Forty years after WWII Soviet politicians still conceive
of their policies toward Eastern Europe, and even the
internal affairs of the six countries as an extension of
Soviet domestic policy ." 41
This type of thinking began to change with the advent of
Gorbachev. The day after he became Secretary General he
indicated that his "first commandment" would be a
strengthening of relations with the East European countries.
Judging from his primary desire to reinvigorate the Soviet
economy, this strengthening was probably designed to reshape
economic practices throughout the CMEA countries. Although
Gorbachev wanted to move away from a Stalinist economic model
and encouraged his allies to do the same, he never envisioned
such a radical change from them. But by advocating more
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"openness" and an acknowledgment of past mistakes, Gorbachev
also risked destabilizing his Warsaw Pact allies.
Historically, the Soviet Union sought stability and
conformity from these countries. In the end, Gorbachev
sacrificed stability in favor of change. His goal was to
make socialism workable. The end result, at least in East-
Central Europe, was the successful challenge and defeat of
this model by the cives.
William Luers includes St. Agnes, St. Wenceslaus, Tomas
Masaryk, the Muses, the Dalai Lama, Pope John Paul II, Vaclav
Havel, and Mikhail Gorbachev in his "long and eclectic" list
of who destroyed communism in Czechoslovakia. He stated,
however, that the person who started it was Mikhail
Gorbachev
.
"The ideas underpinning the clean sweep of the communist
dominion in Eastern Europe flowed without question from
perestroika and glasnost." 42
Luers made the point that although the earlier events in
East Germany of waves of people leaving via Hungary and
Czechoslovakia caught the attention of young Czechs and
Slovaks, while also opening their minds to the potential for
"mass action," that without Gorbachev, the "mass action"
would have met the same fate as Hungary in 1956, and
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The decisive factor was that Gorbachev's policies
directly impacted on the other major reasons why communism
collapsed in the area. In short, dissent, protests, lack of
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interest in Marxist-Leninism by these countries and an
increased role of religion were not enough to "topple the
regimes." The local communist governments could deal with
these "threats." What they could not defend against was the
rapidly changing Soviet agenda which encouraged certain
elements of these "forces," namely; students, intellectuals,
and disenfranchised communists to challenge these regimes.
This, coupled with the fact that no Soviet troops would be
used against the increasing waves of demonstrators, led to
the collapse of communism.
"Ultimately they left power because they were
demoralized. Then, unable to use military force in the
face of overwhelming masses of demonstrations, they
became powerless." 4 ^
1989 was an extremely important year for the people of
East-Central Europe. No one predicted the rapidity with
which the Communist governments of East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania would collapse. The consequences
of Communism's collapse are now being felt not only in East-
Central Europe, but in the West as well. There are new
economic markets for western investment and the opportunity
of the East-Central European states to integrate more with
their western neighbors by entering the European Economic
Community, as well as changing the roles of NATO and the WTO.
To scholars familiar with the history, politics, and
culture of the region, the words; "exhilarating," "ironic,"
even "unbelievable" barely shed light on the remarkable
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transformation of the area. The transformation of
Czechoslovakia from a repressive, authoritarian regime to a
democratic and pluralist society happened so quickly that
analysis of the decision making process and activities from
groups such as the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence
have only now begun to appear. Part of the difficulty in
attempting an analysis of the events which removed the
Communist Party from power is the fact that since it is a
recent "phenomenon.” Few in depth studies of book length do
not yet exist in great numbers
. Although there are several
books that illustrate the events leading to the collapse,
this thesis has had to rely mainly upon journal and magazine
articles to provide analysis of events leading to the
transformation, the influence of the Soviet Union, and
lastly, what the policy objectives in politics and economics
of the new government in Czechoslovakia will be. Even though
some articles cover the collapse of Communism, these tend to
concentrate not on the question of why these governments
collapsed, but rather, in what direction are these countries
going? Bearing these facts in mind, the analysis will now
illustrate the major factors of the "Velvet Revolution."
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CHAPTER 3
THE VELVET REVOLUTION
1989 was the year that Communism collapsed and, in
Havel's words, "the government returned to the people." The
new leadership of Czechoslovakia presents a case of supreme
irony, illustrating not only change, but the speed with which
Communist rule ended. The new Chairman of Parliament,
Alexander Dubcek, had, only weeks earlier been in
official exile as a forestry worker in Bratislava. The new
President of the country, dissident writer, and member of the
Charter 77 human rights group, Vaclav Havel had been jailed
repeatedly by both the Husak and Jakes regimes for his views
which were contrary to those of the regime. Jiri Dienstbier,
also a member of Charter 77, went from coal stoker to foreign
minister in less than a month.
The termination of Communist rule came on December 11,
when a noncommunist government assumed power for the first
time in forty one years. The protests of thousands in
Wenceslaus Square, and the resignation of the Communist Party
leadership heralded the event. However, even while being
assailed on all sides by popular opposition led mainly by
Civic Forum in the Czech lands, and Public Against Violence
in Slovakia, the Communist Party attempted to retain power.
By replacing some of the hardliners, including Jakes, the
Party attempted cosmetic changes in order to placate an
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increasingly dissatisfied public. The Communist leadership
hoped that by offering a "third way, " that is, a "power
sharing" arrangement with the popular opposition, they would
be able to retain power until this storm of unrest eventually
blew itself out . The Civic Forum leadership and most of the
general public saw that the Communists were attempting to
retain control and rejected this action by taking to the
streets
.
This upheaval was not another Prague Spring. The events
of November and December of 1989 were not an effort to reform
or restructure the existing socialist model. The mood in
1967-68 was that the Soviet model adopted by Czechoslovakia
after World War II could be improved and altered sufficiently
so that society's political, social, and economic needs could
be met. A decentralized economic model was proposed, along
with a free press, and more democratic freedoms. The
experiment with "Socialism with a human face" ended with a
Warsaw Pact invasion. The "Velvet Revolution" of 1989
evolved as a fresh attempt at attaining a pluralist
democratic system and a market based economy outside the
boundaries of the existing socialist model.
In Timothy Garton Ash's words; "In Poland it took ten
years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks:
perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!
These words, from an eyewitness accurately explain the
"Velvet Revolution, " or to be more precise, the nonviolent
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end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia. "Students started
it. Ash explains, in his book, The Magic Lantern. Students
organized a demonstration on November 17 marking the fiftieth
anniversary of Jan Opletal, a Czech student who was murdered
by the Nazis. This demonstration transformed into an anti-
government protest, and was met by riot police. The
Czechoslovak government, cognizant of events that had swept
Erich Honecker from power weeks earlier, did not want to be
faced with the same bleak scenario. By dispersing the crowd,
the regime had hoped to quell the opposition. However, quite
the opposite occurred. Ash wrote that instead of eliminating
the opposition, "this was the spark that set Czechoslovakia
alight"
.
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By November 19 very diverse opposition groups of opposition
met in Prague. Vaclav Havel was among the leaders, and the
various groups included: "Committee for the Unjustly
Prosecuted," the "Movement for Civic Freedoms," "Rebirth," (a
club of former Communists) and members of the Socialist Party
to mention a few. This gathering established the Obcanske
Forum, or Civic Forum;
"as a spokesman on behalf of that part of the
Czechoslovak public which is critical of the existing
Czechoslovak leadership and which in recent days has been
profoundly shaken by the brutal massacre of peacefully
demonstrating students. "46
Civic Forum initially made four demands which included:
the immediate resignation of the communist leaders
responsible for preparing the Warsaw Pact intervention of
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1968 Gustav Husak and Milos Jakes, the immediate resignation
of the Federal Interior Minister: Frantisek Kind and Prague
First Secretary Miroslav Stepan—those responsible for the
violent repression of peaceful demonstrations, the
establishment of a special commission to investigate these
police actions, and the immediate release of all prisoners of
conscience
.
Addressing the question of the 1968 intervention
featured very prominently in the Civic Forum program. It was
this event that shaped the last twenty-one years of
Czechoslovak history and had caused so much misery in the
country, and at last, the question of intervention, and
normalization were going to be confronted. The new politburo
declared on December 1 that the WTO invasion that halted the
Prague Spring was wrong. Vasil Mohorita, a new member of the
politburo stated that;
"We are of the opinion that the entry into our territory
of five armies of the Warsaw Pact in 1968 was not
justified, and the decision to do so was wrong. "47
Three days later the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East
Germany, and Bulgaria broke with the past also by jointly
condemning the action. The Soviet Union issued a separate
statement admitting that the invasion was wrong. This was
the first official admission by the Soviet Union that the
invasion had been a mistake. If there was any question
remaining about the applicability of the Brezhnev Doctrine,
the Soviet statement denouncing the invasion removed all
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doubt. Rezso Nyers, Chairman of the Hungarian Socialist
Party commented that the Soviet declaration was "a formal
repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine". 48
A diverse group, Civic Forum was comprised of people
from all aspects of society and included: signatories of
Charter 77, students, actors, intellectuals, and workers.
The Catholic Church was represented by Vaclav Maly, a priest,
Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek, the ninety year old Archbishop of
Prague who had opposed first Nazis, then Communists. Members
of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences titled "prognostics"
( Prognosticky Ustav ) were also part of the coalition, and
included Vaclav Klaus who is now the Finance Minister. This
loose umbrella coalition maintained political pressure on the
Communist government until, lacking any meaningful response,
it collapsed after weeks of marches, speeches, and strikes.
Even though Alexander Dubcek was hailed and cheered by
the thousands who had filled Wenceslaus Square on many
separate occasions, Vaclav Havel emerged as the popular
choice for leadership of the revitalized country. On
November 27th millions of Czechs and Slovaks walked off their
jobs and brought the country to a standstill.
"It was a powerful demonstration of national solidarity in
support of free elections and opposition to Communist
domination .
"
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By this point, it was clear that there would be no "third
way," nor would there be a Communist dominated governing body
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that would accede to sharing power with another group.
Diplomats said that;
it has become an unstoppable wave
. . .the party has
clearly fallen apart
. . .it has no program, ...and is in
danger of finding itself excluded from power
altogether .
"
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Civic Forum, on the other hand, did have a program. It
demanded a "proper" government, responsible to a parliament,
and not the rule of one Party. Vaclav Klaus read to an
assembled crowd from a document titled 'What We Want' and
subtitled 'Programmatic Principles of the Civic Forum' late
in November. It proposed a new Czechoslovakia governed by
the rule of law guaranteed by an independent judiciary, free
elections at all levels, a market economy, social justice,
respect for the environment and independent academic and
cultural life. Later, Klaus read another statement
announcing that the Civic Forum:
" considers its basic objective to be the definitive
opening of our society for the development of political
pluralism and for achieving free elect ions
.
" 51
On November 28th, the Communist Party announced that it
would share power and sacrifice the leading position in
society. Constant pressure was maintained by Civic Forum,
however, and on December 4 over 200,000 people poured into
Wenceslaus Square to reject the Communist government, and to
call for a general strike. Three days later Prime Minister
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Adamec resigned and was replaced by Marian Calfa. On that
same day, Vaclav Havel announced his readiness to be
president
.
"I have repeatedly said my occupation is writer
. . .1
have no political ambitions. I don't feel myself to be a
professional politician. But I have always placed the
public interest above my own. And if the situation
develops in such a way that the only service that I
could render my country would be to do this, then of
course I would do it . " 52
On December 10, Human Rights Day, Gustav Husak swore in
the new government and resigned as president. Faced with a
continuing and unrelenting wave of protests and strikes, the
Communist dominated parliament agreed to give up control of
the nation's top two posts to the two most prominent
opponents of the ancien regime. Alexander Dubcek became the
Chairman of Parliament, while Vaclav Havel was elected
President. He became Czechoslovakia's first non-Communist
President since 1948.
"Dear friends I promise you that I will not betray your
confidence. I will lead this country to free elections.
This must be done in an honest and calm way, so that the
clean face of our revolution is not soiled." 52
With the election of Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakia ceased
reacting to perestroika and began implementing reforms that
go well beyond anything that has taken place thus far in the
Soviet Union. The prospects for substantial reform in the
economic, political, and social spheres can be considered
limited only by the Czechs and Slovaks themselves. The Soviet
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Union would not reassert itself as a hegemonic power, Germany
was concerned primarily with integration of its eastern
provinces, and while the nations of the West greeted "the
fledgling democracies" with enthusiasm, and hope for a
productive future, the ability to provide an aid plan to the
area was limited by their own domestic economic problems.
With the Soviet Union concentrating on domestic issues, and
West Germany trying to assess its move toward union with East
Germany, the smaller East-Central European states were not
caught between competing "great" powers, and this offered an
opportunity for a dramatic transition from Communism to an
indigenous socio-political model. In the Czechoslovak case,
the transition began immediately.
Gorbachev provided the main impetus for change
throughout the region and the various elements of
Czechoslovak society which had remained dormant slowly began
to coalesce into an umbrella grouping that could successfully
challenge a thoroughly entrenched communist party. The
leadership of this revolution was drawn mainly from the
Charter 77 human rights movement, but also included other
sections of society, notably students, workers, and the
Catholic Church. This resulted in no loss of blood and a
relatively easy transition from the communist dominated
government to the interim Civic Forum government. Civic
Forum immediately began changing the structure of government
and formulated new economic and political policies that were
leading to a free market model and a parliamentary system.
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According to Judy Batt, J.M.C. Rollo, and Brigitte Granville,
moving in this direction is the only avenue which may result
in economic success for not only Czechoslovakia, but the rest
of East-Central Europe as well. Their main viewpoint is that
since Leninist political structures had undermined all
previous attempts at economic reform, the removal of these
structures remained the only option open to these countries.
Judging from what the Civic Forum government has already
implemented with regard to decentralizing the economic
system, and initiating a genuine political and economic
reform program, there can be no doubt that the direction
Czechoslovakia is moving is toward a free market combined
with a parliamentary democracy and a more "civil society."
For once in modern history the success or failure of this
reform effort lies squarely in the lap of Czechs and Slovaks.
No hegemony is encroaching upon Czechoslovakian soil. There
is no Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia threatening the
country. Even the nations of the West are largely
concentrating on their own problems despite the fact that
they support free and independent states in East-Central
Europe. What could damage the whole reform effort are the
nationalist rivalries between Czechs and Slovaks that have
submarined past efforts at reform. The "ethnic" or
"nationality" question is the main threat to reform. If
Havel's government can overcome this obstacle then the
chances for a successful transition from communism are quite
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good and the longterm prognosis for economic and political
reform should be better. The last section concentrates on
the changes that have been implemented thus far concludes
with an assessment of "post-communist" Czech and Slovak
Federated Republic.
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CHAPTER 4
AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION
In the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution questions
emerged regarding Czechoslovakia's "new course." The most
obvious of these were directed toward the political and
economic future of Czechoslovakia, as well as what the
philosophical underpinnings of the new government would be.
If reformed socialism was not an objective, then what was?
Since 1948 Communists, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology
had directed the country in all matters both political and
economic. With the abrupt change in Prague, the question
arose as to what would replace Marxist-Leninism as the
philosophical centerpiece of Czechoslovak political and
economic decision making. The Communist Party did not have
an attractive program, and it became increasingly evident
that although the new Czechoslovak government might "borrow"
ideas from the social democratic systems of the West, ie .
,
Sweden, or West Germany there would be no return to
socialism. For the first time in the 20th Century
Czechoslovakia was at liberty to devise a wholly new
political and economic agenda which would be largely
unimpeded by superpower politics. The "Brezhnev Doctrine"
was dead and the Soviet Union continued concentrating on its
own problems in the various republics. West Germany was
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primarily conccrnsd with reunifying with East Germany.
Czechoslovakia, in this century, has been affected negatively
by Germany, during the Nazi period, and after World War II by
Soviet Communism. With a "benign," or at least distracted,
Germany and Soviet Union in Europe, Czechoslovakia can
develop and change its political and economic structure, not
to mention its foreign policy as its needs dictate. These
changes began in earnest under the Civic Forum government led
by President Vaclav Havel in January 1990. A restructured
Communism of any kind is not in the offing. The goal of the
new government is a legitimate functioning democracy, in a
pluralist society, with an open and free market. To these
ends, the government has, and continues to work even at the
writing of this thesis.
The monumental task of establishing a working market
economy began with the passage of legislation through the
Federal Assembly. The economists involved in developing the
new program included Valtr Komarek and Vaclav Klaus. Both
men had worked at the Institute for Economic Forecasting at
the Academy of Sciences and had advocated changing the system
of centralized planning. An article by Klaus titled; "The
Imperatives of Long Term Prognosis and the Dominant
Characteristics of the Present Economy" outlined some parts
of the plan. The article argued for "rapid" and "profound"
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economic reforms and draws attention to the importance of
changing the economic policies of "the center, " in order to
promote market functions.
Immediately after the fall of Communism, the new
Czechoslovak government slowly began to identify and address
major problem areas. Knowing that in order for democracy to
succeed a stable economic environment would be necessary,
Havel's government began by attempting to attract Western
investment
. An Act on private Entrepreneurship of Czech
Citizens effectively stripped away previous limits on private
business
.
"The law allows Czechoslovak citizens to establish
practicing any type of private enterprise with no
restrictions on the number of employees, or the extent of
property accumulation." 54
For the transition from Communism to a market economy to
be successful, economic assistance from the West would be
necessary, and direct foreign investment in Czechoslovakia
was the most beneficial for it due to the fact that it would
increase the hard currency assets, thereby allowing
Czechoslovakia to strengthen its overall economic base.
Czechoslovakia needed hard currency to purchase oil from the
Soviet Union in order to keep its industrial machines in
operation. Since January 1, 1990 the Soviet Union required
oil payments to be in hard currency. In addition to this,
oil would not be subsidized to the extent that it had been
before
.
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In addition to attracting direct foreign investment, the
Czechoslovak government changed budget allocations for 1990.
"The governments approval on March 8 of the state budget
for 1990 was an important step toward economic reform." 55
Vaclav Klaus described it as "the most significant document
of the governments economic policy"
. The government
transformed an earlier version of the budget that called for
a 10 billion koruna [$1 billion official] into a half billion
dollar surplus.
"Fifteen billion koruny have been cut from the budget by
reducing state subsidies in agriculture, mining, state
administration, and defense." 56
The new budget reduced wage and price subsidies by 14%,
subsidies to state enterprises by 10.7%, subsidies to farmers
by 13%, and government administrative costs by 5%. The one
billion koruny previously allocated annually to the CPCz was
discontinued. In addition to cutting subsidies the
government began "phasing out" some heavy industries which
were built during the 1950s. In order to address the problem
of unemployment which would result as some industries were
closed, the government drafted a law on unemployment
benefits, and this went into effect in January.
Klaus stated that price increases were inevitable for
traditionally heavily subsidized items such as food, housing,
and transportation. "If we do not raise prices quickly, we
could all pay dearly for it in the end." The goal, in Klaus'
own words is "a market economy without adjectives." He
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identified the lack of property rights and lack of local
purchasing power as obstacles to reform. He further stressed
the need for an effective pricing structure in order to
overcome obstacles to economic reform.
Czechoslovakia's history of conservative fiscal and
monetary policies has kept the country's borrowing to a
minimum. Today its debt is roughly $8 billion. The strong
industrial base is in a competitive position, especially if
military production is successfully turned into civilian
production. Direct foreign investment such as joint
ventures have been a key ingredient in the process of
transformation. Bloc Magazine reported that entering into
the second half of 1990 there were a total of 602 joint
ventures in Czechoslovakia.
"Eighty percent of the joint ventures possess capital of
less than 1 million kcs (41, 666) and one third have less
than 100,000 kcs ($4,166)." 57
Bloc also reported that the largest proportion of joint
ventures is in Prague (48%), followed by Bratislava (16%) and
Brno (8%)
.
The country breakdown is as follows: Austria-
171, Germany-163, Switzerland-57, United States-32, Great
Britain-23
.
Prior to the enacting of joint venture legislation, the
Civic Forum government assessed the state of the economy by
issuing its "state of the nation report" in February 1990.
On February 27th Marian Calfa spoke to the Federal Assembly
regarding the economy . In his speech he painted a detailed
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and bleak picture of the economic stagnation that had left
Czechoslovakia far behind the West. Calfa described the
catastrophic devastation of the environment, low standard of
living, and the growing social problems. Calfa condemned the
Communist Party's lethargy and monopoly of power, as well as
its lack of effective leadership, and said that it "spelled
death" for creative initiative; which in turn, had gradually
undermined the whole economy.
In January, Calfa outlined the government's plan for a
transition to a market economy, which, he said, would be an
extremely complex task. The plan consisted of four stages.
In the first stage, a legislative and organizational base
would be established incorporating laws to regulate
ownership, competition, and the role of monopolies.
Secondly, new pricing systems would be introduced. The third
stage would consist of expansion of international trade,
liberalized import restrictions, a free flow of capital, and
convertibility of the koruna. Lastly, a new tax system would
be introduced, government subsidies "significantly reduced,"
and prices decontrolled.
The disagreement between Czechoslovak economists at this
point was not that these plans shouldn't be implemented, but
rather the timing of the implementation.
"The timing of the economic reforms has become a basic
point of disagreement between Federal Deputy Prime
Minister Valtr Komarek, who has advocated the gradual
approach, and Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, who has
c o
called for faster progress."
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Prime Minister Calfa agreed with Komarek.
"The process would have to be gradual
. . .in view of the
economy's continued dependence on them, state enterprises
could not be privatized immediately but only over the
long term .
"
5 9
Klaus asserted that the first priority was to ensure that
ending central planning did not bring rapid inflation. On
February 1, 1990 he announced plans to cut subsidies by at
least 15% . His idea was to run a surplus equal to roughly 2%
of state spending, compared to the previous deficit of 1.5%.
Klaus bluntly said that "there is nothing to wait for." He
further cautioned against half-measures, stating that they
could be counterproductive.
On the other hand, Komarek warned that if a market
economy were suddenly thrust upon Czechoslovakia that
economic chaos would result. Some, like Komarek, feared
that moving too fast would cause extreme inflation and
production losses. In various interviews, Klaus stated that
he felt that the problem of liberalizing prices without
creating Polish hyperinflation could be solved by using a
formula which would dismantle the price control system after
the state monopolies had been dissolved. "Klaus hoped that
this sequence would create a competitive environment and
ft 0
control price increases." 0
Regarding the issue of privatization, Klaus stated that
a considerable part of the Czechoslovak economy would remain
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under some type of state control in the future. He said that
as much as forty percent of the economy would be retained by
the state. These included major public works, water
facilities, and transportation facilities. The goal of
privatization of small and medium sized enterprises was one
which could be achieved quickly. These, in turn, would not
be managed by the various ministries, which would eliminate
some of the bureaucracy. In addition to the above,
legislation provided that some state enterprises would be
given the opportunity to become joint stock companies, and to
privatize
.
The East European Reporter wrote that the debate between
"staged transition" and "shock therapy" was solved in favor
of the latter with the Federal Assembly's adoption of "The
Scenario for Economic Reform." The three main points were
privatization, price liberalization, and internal
convertibility for the koruna. Both Bloc Magazine and Europe
Magazine reported that although the some of the details of
this plan have yet to be worked out, it is certain that this
proposal has given the final approval for a rapid transition
to a market economy. Radio Free Europe Research reported in
January 1990 that Czechoslovakia was looking to other
countries while it considered a viable economic strategy.
"Its long social democratic tradition and understandable
concern over the high cost of the economic transition
have made the Swedish or West German concept of a social
6
1
market economy' an attractive choice."
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Czechoslovak Radio reported that in early March a whole
series of economic laws was drafted after the Czechoslovak
government had studied similar laws in West Germany.
Jaroslav Vostatek, the Secretary General of the Economic
Council of the Czechoslovak federal government emphasized
that a law being drafted on state enterprises would eliminate
provisions related to "self administration."
"Allowing those provisions to remain would have created a
potentially inflationary situation such as that in
Yugoslavia, permitting workers to raise wages without
assuring corresponding increases in productivity ." 62
Vostatek said that the self administration concept could
be applied in smaller enterprises that operate in a free
market environment as long as the employees took
responsibility for the economic results. The goal was to
encourage a system of enterprises similar to the large joint
stock companies in West Germany, where workers are part of
the decision-making process and have significant
representation on the supervisory boards.
The overwhelming victory by Civic Forum and Public
Against Violence in the June elections gave Havel's
government the mandate it needed to enact more sweeping
economic reforms in order to place Czechoslovakia in a more
competitive position. In conjunction with the economic
reform measures, and at least as important were the political
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reforms immediately initiated by Civic Forum. The new
government proceeded to move the country in the direction of
a multiparty democracy.
Legislation was passed in February 1990 facilitating the
emergence of new political parties and providing guidelines
for voting and membership. Over forty new parties emerged
covering a wide political spectrum. The Communist Party had
some splinter groups like the Czech Democratic Forum, and the
Independent Left. A Social Democratic party has been
officially re-established after many years of being merged
with the CPCz . At least five parties with Christian-
democratic programs exist and claim roughly 70,000 members.
The Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative and the Liberal
Democratic Party represent those advocating political and
economic liberalism. The Republican Union, Republican Party,
and the Civic Democratic Alliance claim to advocate Western
style political conservatism and economic liberalism. There
is also the Green Party, founded in December 1989, which
claims widespread support in both the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. Given the extent of the ecological devastation
caused by forty years of Communism, it is likely that the
Green Party will play a major role in Czechoslovak politics
into the 1990s. The above represent those political parties
which will probably be significant political forces in the
country, or if not successful by themselves will forge
coalition partnerships with each other, or smaller fringe
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elements. The carefree attitude of the Velvet Revolution is
reflected by the presence of small parties such as; The
Friends of Beer, and the Flexible Party.
Almost as quickly as the political party structure began
to take shape in Czechoslovakia, so did the new foreign
policy
.
"For the first time since the Communist takeover in 1948,
Czechoslovakia has returned to independent international
activism, seizing the opportunity to pursue its own
interests .
"
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At present the fundamental tenet of Czechoslovak foreign
policy is to contribute to the development of the idea of a
"common European home." To that end it has placed keen
interest in disarmament, promoted closer economic cooperation
between West and East, has continued active relations with
the Soviet Union, and has played a role in German
reunification. In an effort to show more independence from
Moscow, and illustrate the country's new shift in priorities,
President Havel visited Germany, Canada, Poland, Hungary, and
the United States during his first months in office. Early
in February Czechoslovakia and Israel resumed full diplomatic
relations after a lapse of over twenty years.
Czechoslovakia has expressed an interest in joining the
European Community and as early as February 1990 began
planning for this goal. At a conference in Paris Jiri
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Dienstbier said that;
"Czechoslovakia hopes for regional cooperation among
Central European nations
. . .Such regional cooperation
will also facilitate eventual East European association
with the economic community of Western Europe ." 64
There can be little doubt that Czechoslovakia would like
to join the European Community soon. Rita Klimova, the
Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States, when questioned
about whether or not Czechoslovakia wanted to join the
European Community replied;
"Who wouldn't want to be a member of the E.C.? That
would signify a full-fledged and functioning market
economy .
"
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Since the economic problems faced by Czechoslovakia must
be considered of prime importance it is not surprising that
many foreign policy endeavors undertaken by the new
government were geared toward changing Czechoslovakia's
economic relationship with the rest of the world. By the end
of the year the Havel government was successful in obtaining
Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status from the United States, and
joining both the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund. Bloc magazine reported that the awarding of MFN status
could increase Czechoslovak exports to the United States by
200 - 300 % .
Havel's government has initiated substantial political
reform during its first six months in office. The Federal
Assembly played a major role in adopting legislation
guaranteeing certain human rights, such as freedom of
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association, freedom of assembly, the right to petition, and
freedom of the press. Richard Sacher, the new Interior
Minister has curtailed police actions. While the new
government began taking steps to protect basic human rights,
it also made changes in its penal code. The death penalty
was abolished and several activities like "damaging the
interests of the republic" ceased to be "political crimes."
Richard Sacher, the new Interior Minister has curtailed
police action and interference with social and political
groups
.
Judy Batt wrote that;
"a new type of leadership is needed . . .whose authority
is derived from the support of a Parliament
. .
.Electoral reform and the resuscitation of genuine
parliamentary politics provide the essential underpinning
for reformist leadership." 66
The "new leadership" is needed not only to assist in the
implementation of the economic transition but to also address
the societal problems that have been caused by over forty
years of communism. In looking at the period from January-
June 1990 my conclusion is that the Civic Forum government
has been successful in the resuscitation of genuine
parliamentary politics as well as the curtailing of the power
of the bureaucracies. The philosophical outlook of Vaclav
Havel has been at least partly responsible for this. He is a
charismatic leader who concentrates on "morality versus
expediency in the decision-making process and he, by virtue
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of his office, has reintroduced morality into the Czech and
Slovak political culture. If this is combined with the Czech
tradition of participation in societies, clubs, and various
other associations, which had not been totally extinguished
by forty years of communism, then the end result will be a
country that has abandoned Marxist-Leninism in favor of a
pluralistic "civil society."
Czechoslovakia has entered a new phase of its history
and although there are still people who call themselves
"communists" and a legitimate communist party still remains,
the chances of a return to this type of system are non-
existent in the short term and highly unlikely in the long
run. Charles Gati has said that;
"The Communist period lacks appealing historical figures
to remember except Nagy and Dubcek . These exceptions
aside, the prevailing atmosphere of fervent anti-
communism and anti-Sovietism allows no subtle
7distinctions to be made."
Czechoslovakia will not be emulating a Soviet model in the
future, but will move in the direction of a more western
social, economic, and political model. Whatever post-
communist Czechoslovakia arrives at for this model, there are
certainly elements of it which will be "uniquely Czech.
Two conflicting forces have shaped political life in
postwar East-Central Europe: The presence and integrating
influence of Soviet communism, on the one hand, and the
diverse political, economic, and cultural traditions of these
countries, on the other. Until Gorbachev the former of these
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forces was the stronger of the two. With his ascent to power
the individual nations have been able to reassert themselves
in international politics and economics. This is due to the
fact that although the Soviet Union continues to influence
the area, under Gorbachev it has concentrated on domestic
problems while also implementing a more flexible foreign
policy toward the area. As the Soviet Union's foreign policy
relied less and less on ideology and national security
interests were re-evaluated the countries of East-Central
Europe suddenly achieved an autonomy that they had not had
since the interwar period (1918-1938) . This autonomy has
resulted in a movement by the new Czechoslovak government
away from a single party, centrally controlled system, in
the direction of a more western political and economic model.
The transition government in Czechoslovakia has realized
that meaningful reform cannot simply be attained by extensive
personnel changes in the apparatus and is moving in the
direction of parliamentary politics.
"This government is taking vigorous legislative action to
satisfy popular demand for democratic political reform."
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In researching this thesis the recurrent theme maintained
by many is that despite the mass demonstrations, role of the
church, and dissident activity in Czechoslovakia the
singlemost influential factor resulting in the demise of
communism in this country was Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.
Indeed, authors cite the fact that there were a variety of
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"forces" at play which caused the communist government to
step down in 1989, but most, including Charles Gati, Judy
Batt, and William Luers all point to Gorbachev as the
decisive factor. In this analysis I must agree. Indigenous
attempts at reform whether from above as in Czechoslovakia in
1968, or from below, as in Hungary in 1956 were seen as a
threat to the Soviet Union both ideologically and
politically. Gorbachev changed the variables throughout his
tenure by indicating in speeches, writings, and actions that
Soviet interests had changed. When he formally killed the
Brezhnev doctrine in his Strasbourg speech in June of 1989
this gave "carte blanche" to the governments of East-Central
Europe to modify their systems. The Czechoslovak government,
which could never reconcile the after effects of the "Prague
Spring" with the new "Moscow Spring" was, quite simply,
abandoned by its own people. Lacking support from the Soviet
Union, the Czechoslovak government collapsed.
After evaluating the decline and fall of communism in
Czechoslovakia it is useful to end with a short comment about
future research for this subject. It is logical to assume
that as this paper is being written, others are also
grappling with the causes of communism's demise and
attempting to weigh the impact of the individual actors
involved. As stated earlier, my research has indicated that
Gorbachev provided the main impetus for change . Although
there are articles describing the mass demonstrations and the
individual who led them, it would be useful to have an in
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depth examination of the Civic Forum group and other major
groupings in both the Czech lands and Slovakia to illustrate
their precise role in the months of November and December
1989. It would also be interesting to see how the
Czechoslovak military reacted to the monumental changes.
What has been most interesting to me has been the role played
by the Catholic Church, not only as an alternative to the
Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also as a political factor in
the shaping of the new government. In November 1989 when the
crowds were cheering, one must remember that some of the
chants were "Havel, Dubcek, Tomasek*" An historical study of
religion in Czechoslovakia from the aftermath of the Prague
Spring to the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution is necessary
to understand the important role that it played in society as
the largest "organized" alternative to Marxist-Leninism and
communist domination. Lastly, new works on the country are
needed which examine its politics, economics, and culture.
Most works concentrate on the Prague Spring or its aftermath.
Part of the problem with writing about this area is that the
changes happened so quickly in 1989 that viewpoints on "the
limits of reform" had to be changed to reflect what exactly
happened. One could assume that except for smaller analyses
contained in journals and magazine articles, that book length
works will not be widespread until more data is compiled and
more evaluation done on how and why communism collapsed, what
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the aftermath will be, and how these countries are dealing
with their "new found freedom." In Czechoslovakia, the
situation can be summed up by a quotation from Havel during
his New Year's Day address, 1990:
"People, your government has returned to you." 69
"Tva vlada, lide, se k tobe navratila!"
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APPENDIX A
OUTLINE OF THE ACTION PROGRAM
Under the title Czechoslovakia ' s Road To
Socialism, the Czechoslovak Communist Party published
an "Action Programme" on April 9, 1968. There are
noticeable similarities between this program and
Gorbachev's program of perestroika. The major points
of the Action Programme are listed below.
1. The guarantee of freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and religious observance.
2 . Electoral laws to provide a broader choice of
candidates
.
3. Broad economic reforms giving economic enterprises
greater independence, convertable currency, revival of a
limited amount of private trade, and increased trade
with the West
.
4. An independent judiciary.
5. Federal status for Slovakia on an independent basis
and a new constitution drafted by 1969.
6. Full rehabilitation of all persons unjustly
persecuted during 1949-54.
7 . Security police will curb their activities to only
those matters involving the security of the state
.
8. Recognition of past errors.
9. Willingness of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia to adapt
.
10. The Communist Party's leadership role should be
based on the voluntary support of the people.
11. Censorship will be eliminated.
The goals of the Action Program have been summed up
nicely by Ivan Volgyes. Political liberalization,
economic liberalization, and federalizat ion . of the
national system. These, like Gorbachev's aims were to
be carried out within the framework of socialism.
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APPENDIX B
OUTLINE OF PERESTROIKA
Gorbachev's prime effort since becoming the leader of
the Soviet Union in 1985 has been to bring the Soviet
economy out of the economic malais that he attributed
mainly to Brezhnev. In order to accomplish this task
Gorbachev realized that sweeping changes had to be made
throughout Soviet society. In some cases, the changes
that have been proposed and enacted are similar to those
proposed by the Dubcek leadership in 1968.
Some of the elements of perestroika include:
1. Glasnost, or openess : designed to acknowledge
mistakes of past leaders, and to "rehabilitate" non-
persons of Soviet history like Nicolai Bukharin.
2. Plenary Meeting of CPSU Central Committee January
27-28 1987 decided upon organizational reform and
democratization of party life.
3. Liberalization of the economy by allowing some
enterprises more autonomy.
4. Closer cooperation with the West in economics, arms
control, and disarmament.
5. Extension of democracy in socialist self
management
.
6. Greater openess, criticism and self criticism in
all fields of public life.
7. Reform of the electoral procedure.
8. Changes in foreign policy: "a common European
home "
.
9. Greater tolerance of religion.
10. Less restrictions on the media.
This short listing is by no means all inclusive.
It is meant as an outline of some of the major points of
restructuring under Mikhail Gorbachev
.
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APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST-CENTRAL
1985
EUROPE 1985-1989
March 11
CPSU.
Mikhail Gorbachev elected general secretary
May 30-31 Gustav Husak, leader of Czechoslovakia met
with Gorbachev
1986
Feb 26-Mar 6 XXVII CPSU Congress
Mar 24-28 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz)
holds
its 17th Congress. Anti-reform stand taken
by hard-liners.
Sep 2
1982
Members of the "Jazz Section", a group of
musicians arrested by police.
Feb 7 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
visits Prague: Ties between Prague and
Moscow reported "strained". Rude Pravo not
carrying reports of Gorbachev's speeches
about restructuring in the Soviet Union.
Mar 18 Gustav Husak publicly endorses Soviet
reforms and vows to adopt a similar
program
.
Dec 17 Gustav Husak resigns and is replaced by
Milos Jakes.
198&
Jan 11 Jakes visits Gorbachev. Backs reforms and
declares "a unity of views".
Mar 5 Church activists arrested by police.
Prague mass at St . Vitus Cathedral turns
into a rally for religious freedom.
Aug 10 Rude Pravo attacks Alexander Dubcek for
allowing the events of 1968 to go out of
control
.
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Aug 2 0 Members of Charter 77 arrested for laying
flowers at the statue of St. Wenceslaus.
10,000 people march in protest of the 20th
anniversary of the Soviet invasion.
Protesters shout "Dubcek, Dubcek . . .
Soviets out of Czechoslovakia."
Oct 10 Premier Lubomir Strougal along with the
entire cabinet resign. Ladislav Adamec
replaced Strougal, who had been one of the
only advocates of economic reform in the
Party hierarchy. Viewed as a victory for
the "anti-reform" element in the CPCz
.
i2.s_a
Feb 22 Playwright-activist Vaclav Havel convicted
of illegal protests. Sentenced to nine
months
.
Oct 2 8 On the 71st anniversary of the founding of
democratic government, protests against the
Communist government are crushed.
Nov 20-21 More than 200,000 march for freedom in
Wenceslaus Square, largest demonstration
since 1968. Communists hold talks with new
opposition leaders.
Nov 23-24 Alexander Dubcek, reformist leader forced
from power in 1968 re-emerges in public.
Communist Party leadership resigns:
general secretary Milos Jakes replaced.
Nov 28 Communist government promises to yeild
monopoly on power and allow non—Communists
in cabinet. Parliament approves next day.
Dec 4 Hungary, Soviet Union, East Germany,
Poland, and Bulgaria condemn 1968 military
suppression of liberalization in
Czechoslovakia
.
Dec 1
1
Noncommunist government assumes power for
the first time in forty one years.
Communist President Gustav Husak resigns.
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Dec 28-29 Parliament elects Dubcek its chairman,
Vaclav Havel president of the nation.
1990
The newly named Czech and Slovak Federated Republic
begin the tranformat ion from a Communist dominated one
party state to a parliamentary political system and a
functioning market economy.
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APPENDIX D
CZECHSLOVAKIA ELECTION DATA JUNE 1990
Czechslovakia General Elections
June 8 and 9, 1990
% of vote
Czech Slovak
Civic Forum 51.6
Public Against Violence - 34.9
Communist Party 13.7 13.6
Christian Democrats 8.7 17.8
Slovak National Party - 11.2
Hungarian National Party - 8.5
Society for Self Governing Democ . 8.5
Others 17.5 14.0
1. The offical name of the country is the Czech and
Slovak Federated Republic.
2 . The bicameral Federal Assembly has control over
foreign affairs, defense, overall economic policy and
constitutional matters. The Assembly is comprised of a
Chamber of Nations (75 Czech and 75 Slovak delegates),
and a Chamber of People (137 Czech and 63 Slovak
deputies) . The President of the Assembly is Alexander
Dubcek
.
3. The Czech Republic (CR) and Slovak Republic (SR) are
represented by parallel institutional structures. The
Czech National Council (with 200 deputies) and the
Slovak National Council (with 150 deputies) . The
Federal Assembly draws its membership from these
National Councils.
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